Why is Iran against the Zangezur Corridor

I sought Grok’s explanation for Iran’s opposition to The Zangezur Corridor and the potential beneficiaries of its construction. Here’s the response I received, which, while not entirely unexpected, provides further evidence of the underlying reasons for Iran’s stance.

Gains for Azerbaijan, Turkey, and ArmeniaThe Zangezur Corridor is projected to unlock significant economic benefits, with estimates varying based on implementation success and regional stability. Here’s a breakdown:Azerbaijan:Trade and Connectivity: The corridor will link Azerbaijan’s mainland to Nakhchivan, reducing reliance on Iran and Georgia for trade with Turkey. The Geopolitical Monitor (March 2025) highlights its role in the Middle Corridor, potentially increasing Azerbaijan’s transit revenue. Current Caspian Sea trade via Azerbaijan is valued at $15 billion annually (World Bank, 2024 estimate), and the corridor could add 10-15% ($1.5–2.25 billion) by 2027 through improved access to Turkish and European markets. Energy Exports: Azerbaijan’s oil and gas exports (e.g., Southern Gas Corridor) could see a 5-10% boost ($500 million–$1 billion annually) by diversifying routes and reducing transit costs (Forbes, July 2025). Total Gain: $2–3.25 billion annually in the medium term, with potential growth to $5 billion if Nakhchivan develops as a trade hub.

Turkey:Trade Expansion: Turkey stands to gain from enhanced connectivity to Central Asia and Europe via the Middle Corridor. The Forbes article (July 2025) estimates $50–100 billion in annual Eurasian trade flows by 2027, with Turkey capturing 20-30% ($10–30 billion) due to its strategic position. This includes increased exports (e.g., textiles, automotive) and reduced shipping costs (10-15% per Forbes). Geopolitical Leverage: As a NATO member, Turkey’s role could strengthen its economic influence, potentially adding $1–2 billion in indirect benefits from infrastructure investments and military contracts. Total Gain: $11–32 billion annually, with initial gains closer to $11–15 billion as the corridor scales up.

Armenia:Infrastructure and Investment: Armenia, despite initial opposition (Geopolitical Monitor, March 2025), could benefit from U.S. development rights and TRIPP funding. The Forbes estimate of $50–100 billion in regional trade includes Armenia’s share, likely 5-10% ($2.5–10 billion annually), through tolls, jobs, and infrastructure upgrades. Peace Dividend: Normalization with Azerbaijan could unlock $500 million–$1 billion in annual trade with its neighbor, reversing decades of isolation. Challenges: Sovereignty concerns and potential military risks (Iran’s threats) may limit gains unless security is guaranteed. Total Gain: $3–11 billion annually, with initial benefits around $3–5 billion as infrastructure develops.

Comparative AnalysisIran’s Loss vs. Others’ Gains: Iran’s projected loss of $20–50 million annually is modest compared to the $16–46 billion combined annual gain for Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Armenia. However, this loss is significant for Iran’s strained economy (GDP ~$400 billion, IMF 2025 estimate), representing 0.005–0.0125% of GDP, while gains for others range from 2–10% of their respective GDPs (Azerbaijan $78 billion, Turkey $1.1 trillion, Armenia $19 billion). Long-Term Implications: The corridor’s success hinges on peace and U.S. investment. If tensions escalate (e.g., Iran’s “we will block it” stance), gains could be delayed, and Iran’s losses might be mitigated by alternative trade deals with Russia or China.

ConclusionIran’s Loss: $20–50 million annually, with potential long-term erosion of $10–20 billion over a decade if its transit role diminishes significantly. Azerbaijan’s Gain: $2–3.25 billion annually, potentially up to $5 billion. Turkey’s Gain: $11–32 billion annually, starting at $11–15 billion. Armenia’s Gain: $3–11 billion annually, starting at $3–5 billion.

These figures reflect optimistic scenarios from Forbes and Geopolitical Monitor projections. Real outcomes will depend on geopolitical stability, infrastructure completion (targeted for 2027), and Iran’s response, which could include economic countermeasures or regional alliances to offset losses.